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EDEIIAL budget deficits of $200 billion or more
have created considerable controversy and confusion
among analysts, policvrnakers and voters. The impor-
tant problem, of course, concerns the consequences of
current and projected spending, receipts and deficits.
Public concern about these problems began, however,
with the ballooning of deficits in 1982 and 1983.
Many analysts conjecture that recent and projected
large deficits have deleterious effects on the economy
— raising interest rates, exchange rates, the inflation
rate, crowding out private sector investment and eco-
nomic growth and threatening the economic recovery.
Others are more sanguine, arguing instead that recent
deficits have not significantly affected interest rates,
exchange rates or price behavior.1
The purpose of this article is to assess these con-
trasting views on the causes and consequences of re-
cent and prospective deficits. Most of the controversy
arises from differences in theoretical and empirical
judgments about the effects of deficits on the demand
for goods and services. After examining these relevant
conceptual issues, recent trends in the federal budget
are taken up. Then these conceptual distinctions are
used to clarity the source and potential economic
effects of recent and projected deficits.
In the view of many analysts, both current deficits
and future projections indicate a major breakwith the
U.S. postwar experience. It is suggested below that this
view is unwarranted when applied to recent deficits.
While recent deficits have been large compared with
earlier ones, they have arisen largely from the unusual
cyclical experience in the U.S. economy, not fi’om un-
precedented fiscal policy actions that raised spending
and!or reduced tax receipts. Future deficits, however,
may represent a majorbreak from the current and past
experience. if so, past relationships between deficits
and economic performance may prove to be of little
use in judging their likely effects.
THE THEORY OF ACTIVE AND
PASSIVE DEFICITS
The federal budget deficit is the excess of federal
government expenditures over receipts. In analyzing
the sources ofthedeficit and its effect on theeconomy,
it is necessary to distinguish between “active” and
passive” components of the deficit. Spending, taxes
arid, therefore, the actual deficit are affected by both
direct policy actions and changes in the level of eco-
nomic activity, prices and interest rates. The latter
changes occur passively, that is, without fiscal policy
actions. Active deficits, in contrast, are those that arise
fi’om legislated changes in spending or taxes,given the
other economic conditions that influence the deficit.
One attempt to deal with this difference is the
measurement of the so-called high-employment
budget. It involves measuring expenditures and tax
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1An example of the latter argument is the study by the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury (1g84). There does appear to be general
agreement about the possibilitythat deficits can be “monetized,” that
is, financed by money creation, To the extent this occurs, inflation
would accelerate.
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receipts at a high-employment level of real GNP, given
actual prices and interest rates. This measure is useful
because it removes that part of the actual deficit that
ar’ises from passive adjustment to cyclical fluctuations
in real GNP,
For example, as i-cal income expands, tax receipts
rise and spending primarily transfer payments) de-
clines, so that the actual deficit shrinks. This decrease
or increase when real incomes fall) reflects auiorna tic
movements that are built-in to existing tax and spend-
ing legislation,This automatic response of the deficitto
economic conditions is referred to as a change in the
passive deficit. In contrast, legislated increases in
spending or- tax reductions raise the actual deficit at
any level of GNP and produce a change in the active
deficit. At each point in time, the observed deficit
reflects both an active component — the size of the
deficit at, for example, a high-employment level of real
output — and a passive component — the part due to
the business cycle.
Conventional economic analysis, which forms the
basis for much of the current popular discussion, fo-
cuseson the effects ofahigher active deficit that arises
fi’om either-adiscretionary increase in federal expendi-
tures or a cut in taxes. The conventional wisdom indi-
cates that an increase in the active deficit causes
spending on goods and services to rise, A federal
purchase of goods or services directly raises total
aggregate spending; increased transfer’ payments or
tax reductions allow greater spending in the private
sector. Thus, a change in the activedeficit is important
because it affects the level of real GNP.
At its simplest level, the conventional analysis indi-
cates that, if the money stock is unaltered, interest
rates will rise along with real GNP, At higher levels of
spending and income, the demand In’ money will be
higher. Thus, in this view, interest r’ates must go up
to r’ation the available money stock. Of course, a rise
in rates tends to choke off some of the expansion in
spending and income that results from an increase in
the active deficit. This latter effect is called ‘crowding—
out” because the rise in interest rates discourages
(crowds out) private investment and consumer pur-
chases.
Ifincome and spending rise as a result ofan increase
in the active deficit, prices are likely to rise as well. At
unchanged prices, the higher level of demand for real
output is unlikely to be produced. To induce suppliers
to produce more output, the general level of prices will
have tobe hid up. Ahigher level ofprices induces more
crowding out, since it causes a reduction in thesupply
of purchasing power available from a given nominal
money stock relative to the demand for it, Thus, in-
terest rates rise further and more private spending is
crowded out.
In summary, a simple version ofconventional theory
states that a rise iii the active deficit raises not onlythe
level of output and employment, but pr’ices and in-
terest rates as well, Crowding-out ofprivate investment
occurs, slowing the growth rate of economic capacity.
A rise in the passive deficit, in contrast, reflects a
cyclical decline in real GNP and employment. Passive
deficit increases do not exert an independent effect on
economicactivity,2 Moreover, such deficit increases, in
the simple conventional analysis, are typically associ-
ated with a decline in inter-est rates andlor prices, since
cyclical declines in real GNP reflect declining demand
for goods and services and credit.
There are many linkages in the results above that are
open to question. Mainstream macroeconomic con-
clusions depend heavily on alter-native hypotheses
about the sensitivity ofinvestment, consumer spend-
ing, money demand and aggregate supply to interest
rate and price level fluctuations. Depending on these
assumptions, considerably different conclusions
about the effects of an increase in the active deficit can
emerge.3
Central to the conventional analysis is the conclu-
sion that an increase in the active deficit raises the
demand for goods and services at unchanged prices
and interest rates. Even this result is, in principle,
problematic. Sonic analysts emphasize that the de-
mand fur goods and services is not raised by an in-
crease in the active deficit. Federal spending, they
point out, must he financed — if not in the present,
then in the future, Thus, households will tend to dis-
count the increased future tax liability that arises fi’om
an increase in the active deficit, In effect, households
match the increased deficit by an equivalent increase
2Movements in the passive deficit are endogenous with respect to
movements in real GNP, while active deficits are not. A rise in the
passive deficit, when real GNP falls, may reduce the extentof the real
GNP decline itself and the interest rate decline as well. Those adlust.
ments, however, are endogenous because they are built-in to the
structure of the economy.
3For illuminating discussions of these issues, see Carlson and
Spencer (1975),Cohen and Clark (1984) and Knoester (1983). The
latter shows that balanced budget increases in active fiscal policy
lead to larger structural unemployment, higher wages and prices,
larger future deficits and lower economic growth.
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Latent data plotted: tnt quorfe’
in personal saving (orcut in consumption). Thus, total
spending, given interest r-ates and pt-ices, does not
rise1
If such discounting of futur-e taxes occur-s, the con-
ventional conclusions about the effects of active defi-
cits fail to hold, except forthose concerning ci-owding-
out, capital formation and economic growth. Others
have noted the theoretical ambiguity of mainsti-eam
theory in this regard.5 Thus, while the channels of
influence of a change in the deficit are clear-, especially
the impor-tance of the active—passive distinction, the
assessment of the effects of a rise in the active deficit
remains essentially an empirical question.
4This result is referred to as the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. See
Barro (1974, 1978), as well as Buchanan and Wagner (1977).
5See. especially, the recent analysis by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury.
RECENT BUDGET TRENDS
The fedet-al budget deficit soared to $147 billion
National Income Account, NIA,basis) in calendar year
1982, then rose to about $183 billion in 1983. Projec-
tions for- the next several year’s r’ange from a slight
decline to a near doubling by the end of the decade. It
is useful to compare the budget developments of the
past two years with past trends to gain some under-
standing of how the deficit became so large.
Chart I shows the gr-owth of federal spending and
receipts as shares of CNP fr-om 1948 to 1983. Thedeficit
thedifference between expenditures and r-eceipts, alsc
is shown as a share of GNP. In the fourth quar-ter- ol
1982, the deficit r-eached a peacetime r-ecord 6.7 per-
cent of (JNP. While this proportion subsequently de-
clined, it r-emained above 5 percent thi-ough 1983.
The sm-ge in the deficit is associated with an accel
eration in federal expenclitur’e growth and a decline ii
1950 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 1984
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chart 2
Federal Government Expenditures as a Share of GNP
Shaded areas represent periods 0r business recessions-
Latest data plotted: 1st quo rte
receipts growth, when both are measured relative to
GNP. For example, from 1980 to 1983, when GNP grew
at a 7.9 per-cent annual r-ate, expenditures grew at an
11.1 percent i-ate and federal receipts rose at only a 6.0
per-cent rate. As a result, expenditures rose from 22.9
pci-cent of GNP in 1980 to25.0 percent in 1983, and the
share of receipts fell from 20.6 percent to 19.5 percent.
Thus, over’ this time interval, the deficit widened from
2.3 percent to 5.5 per-cent of GNP.
The Growth of Federal Expenditures
The sharp surge upward in federal expenditures as a
share ofGNP is shown again in chart 2, where expendi-
tures are broken into two major’ categories: the put’-
chase of goods and services and ti-ansfer payments
(including transfers to persons, state and local govern-
ments, net inter-eston the federaldebt and subsidies to
government enterprises). From 1967 to 1979 the share
of expenditures in GNP rose little (except for- a tempo-
rawspurt in 1975), with the surge in transfer payments
almost offset by the decline in purchasesofgoods arid
services. Since 1979, however, both components of
federal expenditures have r-isen relative to GNP. Pur-
chases of goods and services t-ose from 7.0 per-cent to
8.3 percent of GNP from 1979 to 1983, while transfer
payments continued their- previous trend of rising fas-
ter- than GNP, increasing from 14.1 percent to 16.6 per-
cent of GNP.
The patter-n offederal put-chases of goods and ser-
vices closely mirrors that of national defense expendi-
tures (not shown), since the remainder-, non-defense
purchases, has r-emained about 2 percent to 3 per-cent
of GNP since the early 1960s. National defense pur-
chases, after declining fi-om 1968 to 1979, r-ose from 4.6
percent ofGNP in 1979 to 6.0 percent in 1983. This rise
accounts for all of the rise in the share of purchases in
GNP, but only 36 percent ofthe increase in theshare of
expenditures in GNP and an even smaller percentage
of the incr-ease in the deficit measured relative to GNP.
1950 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 1984
Source: National Income and Product Accounts
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Chart S
Federal Government Receipts as a Share of GNP
Federal Receipts as a Share of GNP
The share of federal receipts in GNP is shown in
chart 3 along with its major components: personal tax
and non-tax receipts, social security contributions and
corporate income taxes. From 1979 to 1983, the share of
social security taxes in GNP continued its upward
climb, rsing from 6.6 percent to 7.1 percent. This in-
crease largely offset thedecline in the share ofpeisonal
taxes fi-om 9.5 percent to 8.9 percent over- the same
period. Corporate taxes declined from 3.1 pet-cent to
1.8 percent of GNP from 1979 to 1983, a decline that
reflected an actual decline in such receipts fi’om $74.2
billion to $59.3 billion. In lw-ge part, this was due to a
similar percentage decline in corporate profits from
$252.7 billion in 1979 to about $207.6 billion in 1983.
The Sources ofRecent Deficits
It appears that the recent ballooning offederal defi-
cits has been associated with acombination of adverse
budgetatv developments rather than a single cause.
Expenditures have sut-ged upward relative to the na-
tion’s GNP, primarily because of the continued r-apid
growth of transfer pr-ograms such as social security
payments, Medicare, unemployment benefits and in-
terest on the national debt. At the same time, receipts
have grown more slowly than GNP, largely becauseof a
decline in corpor-ate income and corporate income tax
receipts.
Simple explanations that attribute recent deficits to
the defense buildup that began in 1979 or to tax cuts
.08
1950 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 1984
Latest data platted: 1st quarter Source: National Income and Product Accounts
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Chart 4
Personal Taxes as a Share of Earned Personal Income a
a Personal nuns rnrlude social sesurity tnees. Earned personal income is personat
Shnded ornus represent periods °tbusiness recessions.
t.ntnst data plotted: 1st quarter
are inadequate for under-standing recent deficits.ti
From 1979 to 1983, growth in the shar-e of defense
spending in GNP accounts for only 1.4 percentage
points of a 4.8 percentage-point r-ise in the deficit as a
percent ofGNP (from 0.7 percent to 5.5 percent(. Other
expenditures, in particular transfer-payments, account
for a considerably lar-ger pat-t of the rise.
The tax cut argument is simply wi-ong. Personal tax
rates generally have risen since the passage of the 1981
tax cut, a :cutr~ that evidently was a poor substitute for
indexing (which begins in 1985). Confusion arises be-
cause, while tax rates and taxes obviously were cut
from levels that they would otherwise have attained,
actual tax rates tended to rise from 1980 to 1984. The
cut in personal marginal tax r-ates was largely offset by
intlation-induced “bracket creep” and social security
tax hikes.’
Business tax cuts, provided primarily through
6See ‘How to Cut the Deticit” (1984), p. 50, for example.
7See Tatoni (1981), Mckenzie (1982) and Meyer (1983), for example.
accelerated depreciation (the Accelerated Cost Recov-
erySystem) substantially reduced effective tax rates on
income from new investments, but had only a minor
impact on averagetax rates or’ on the real taxburden on
businessincome from 1980 to 1983.8 ‘I’he lion’s share of
the observed decline in corporate income taxes as a
share of GNP has been related to the business cycle.
Lower tax rates on corpor’ate income and accelerated
depreciation have been tar-gels’ offset by new indirect
businesstaxes. Moi-eover, thetaxation ofcapital, which
arises from the use of historical costs in calculating
depreciation in the face of inflation-induced boosts in
replacement costs, has continued to increase.
Charts 1—3 show clear-ly that recent budget develop-
ments are largely related to the business cycle. Dur-ing
the shaded recession periods, expenditures (especially
tr-ansferprograms) typically r-ise arid receipts generally
fall relative to GNP. Indeed, with the exception of the
1953—54 recession, when expenditures fell relative to
GNP as a result of a sharp decline in national defense
usee Hulten and Robertson (1982) and Meyer.
1950 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 14 76 18 80 62 1984
Source: Notional tncomn and Prodect Acconntu
income tess trot ster payments
10FEDERAL RESERVE BANKOF ST. LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1984
expenditur-es, this pattern has been observed in each
postwar recession. The greater extent of the recent
recession has amplified the cyclical swing in the
deficit.
A fur-ther example of the effect of the cycle on the
federal budget is given in chart 4, where a measur-e of
the average tax r-ate on “ear-ned” personal income is
given. flansfer payments ar-c excluded from personal
income in the char-f, because they ar-c not subject to
federal taxes; social security contt-ibutions are added
to federal personal income taxes, because they at-c
consider-ed to be as direct and personal as income
taxes. A cyclically adjusted aver-age tax rate measure
also is shown.”
The rates in chart 4 proside little indication of the
so-called tax cut.The actual rate rosefrom 22.9 per-cent
in 1979 to 23.1 per-cent in 1980, then fell slightly to 22.7
percent in 1983. ‘There is some indication of a decline
after mid-1982, but the average level for- 1983 was vir-
tuafly unchanged frorii its 1979 and 1980 levels.
On a cyclically adjusted basis, the evidence that
taxes werecut is evenweaker. On this basis, the average
tax rate rosefrom 23.1 percent in 1979 to23.5 percent in
1980 and reached 24.0 per-cent in 1983. While the tax
rate declined somewhat in 1983 fromn its 1982 level, it
was still above its 1980 level, the year’ before the “tax
cut” began.
The 1.3 pel-centage-point differ-ence between the
actual and the cyclically adjusted aver-age tax rates
represents a $30.4 billion shortfall in federal t-eceipts
based on the level of income in 1983. Mor-eover’, such
income would have been substantially higher if the
unemployment rate had averaged 5 per-cent in 1983
instead of the actual 9.6 per-cent rate. Each percentage
point of unemployment is associatedwith about a2to
2t/, per-centz ge-point loss in real and nominal GNP and
a 2¼ to 2¾pet-centage-point decline in personal in-
nThe cyclical (mpact on the tax rate is tound from the coefficient on
unemployment in a regression model ot the tax rate. The equation
regresses the quarterly change in the actual tax rate on: changes in
the unemployment rate lagged one quarter, the inflation rate (GNP
deflator), a time trend, dummy variables for the 1964 tax cut (I in the
first and second quarters of 1964) and the 1975 tax rebate (1 in the
second quarterof 1975 and minus 1 in thethird quarterof 1975) and a
constant, for the period 111950 to IV/1983. When the equation is
estimated toIll/i981 and then simulated to V/I983, it is stable and
reveals no significant errors. The cyclicallyadiusted measure :.adds
back” the decline in the tax rate due to the excess of unemployment
over a full-employment unemployment rate of about 5 percent in
recent years. The cyclical effect associates a I percentage-point
increase in the unemployment rate with a 0.25 percentage-point
reduction in the average tax rate.
conic less ttansfer payments.”’ Thus, the loss in per-
sonal tax receipts alone in 1983 was about $72 billion, a
substantial share of the observed budget deficit.
Chart 5 shows the deficit as a pet-cent of GNP and
the high-employment deficit as a percent of high-
employment CNP.t’ Typically, the high-employment
deficit as a share of high-employment GNP has ranged
between plus or minus 2 percent.5’ While actual defi-
cits have risen substantially as a share of GNP since
mid-1981, deficits measured on a high-employment
basis have remained within that range.’3 For example,
usingfiscal year periods (ending in the third quarter’of
each year), the 1.6 percent high-employment deficit
registered in 1983 was equaled or exceeded in 1967 and
1968 (1.8 percent and 1.6 petcent, respectively.’4
‘°See Tatom (1978) for a discussion otOkun’s Law, the relationship ot
unemployment tothe GNP gap. Therelationship ofpersonal income
(less total transfer payments) to the business cycle was found by
regressing quarterly changes in the logarithm of the ratio of such
income to GNP on a constant and changes in the unemployment
rateadjusted for a high-employment benchmark. The optimal lag is
current and two lagged changes; no additional statistically signifi-
cant information is provided by introducing longer lags. In level form,
the sum coefficients indicate that each 1 percent of unemployment
reduces the ratio of personal income less transferpayments to GNP
by 0.28 percent.
“The high-employment budget data are prepared by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, following
methods described in deLeeuw and others (1980). Their analysis
uses a more disaggregated form of the cyclical adiustment proce-
dure described in footnote 9. The high-employment budget data
indicate the point above concerning “tax cuts,” In fiscal 1980, the
share of high-employment budget receipts in potential GNP was
20.7 percent. This ratio fell only slightly to 20.4 percent in fiscal
1983.
‘2The standard deviation of the high-employment deficit ratio is 1.17
percentage points for the period 1/1955 to Ill/i983.
“The high-employment and actual deficit ratio are highly correlated
(chart 5). This raises the suspicion that eitherthe passive deficit has
not been fully removed from the high-employment deficit or that
there are cyclical changes in the active deficit; that is, policymakers
respond quickly to changes in real GNP with active policies.
These cyclical movements in the high-employment deficit ratio
were verified by regressing its changes on changes in the unem-
ployment rate, using quarterly data from 11/1955 to 111/1983; (d,~
d, ,) = —0.012 ± 0.417 (UN1
— UN, ,), where d is the high-
employment deficit ratio (deficits measured positively), and UN is
theunemployment rate. The t-statistics are —0.2 and 3.07 for the
constant and slope, respectively. Lags on thechange in unemploy-
ment are not significant. A first-order autocorrelation correction is
used. The unemployment rate (roughly theexcess of the unemploy-
ment rateabove 5 percent in fiscal 1983) coefficient indicates that
an extra 5.1 percent unemployment rate raises the measured high-
employment deficit ratio by 2.1 percent, somewhat morethan the
1.6 percent ratio observed in fiscal 1983. Thus, it appearsthat the
“true” deficit ratio for 1983 would be nearzero but slightly in surplus.
‘4These earlierpeaks in the high-employment (and actual) deficit ratio
were of great concern to analysts atthe time; in particular, they led to
the proposal of a temporary income tax surcharge in January 1967
and its passage in mid-1968.
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chart 5
Deficits as a Share of 01*
shaded areas represeeI periods or buninnss rncnssions.
Latest data plotted: High-employrnnnt”Ath quarter: Actual—Ist quarter
THE DEFICIT OUTLOOK: FROM
PASSIVE TO ACTIVE DEFICITS?
While recent budget deficits appeat to have been
largely the result of the 1980 and 1981—82 t-ecessions,
projections of future expenditures, receipts and defi-
cits show a different picture. Such projections are
shown in table 1, with ear-her actual data for- compar-i-
son purposes.
The first column in table I shows the estimated
deficit for fiscal years 1983 to 1989, based on the
assumptions used in the pi-epar-ation of the fiscal 1985
budget fot- the economy on a “cut-rent services” basis,’5
The current services budget measures assume that all
federal pr-ograms and activities in thefuture remain the
same as those adopted for the 1984 fiscal year (ending
“See Council of Economic Advisers (1984), p. 36.
in September 1984) and that there are no policy
changes in such progi-ams.”’ They also iricor-porate
assumptions about future spending, real GNP growth,
inflation, interest rates and unemployment.
The projected total deficits remain substantial
through 1989, providing support for- recent concerns
about “large” deficits. Note, however-, that lelative to
the size of the economy or- GNP, the actual deficit
declines after- 1983.
The table also pr-ovides a breakdown of the deficit
into “cyclical” and “structur-al” components. This dis-
tinction is similar- to the high-employment vs. actual
deficit categoties used pr-eviously. In this instance,
howevel, the cyclical deficit arises from the departure
of real GNP from its 1969-to-1981 tt-end, rather- than
“For a detailed discussion, see Office of Management and Budget
(1984), pp. A-I to A-38.
1956 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 14 76 78 80 82 1984
Source: Notional Income and Product Accounts
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from ahigh-employment level. The structural deficit is
the level that would exist if real GNP were at its trend
level; the smaller high-employment deficit measures
the deficit that would exist were real GNP at a high-
employment level.
are measured on a high-employment basis.’8 The size
of projected str-trctural deficits in the current budget
estimatesare likelyto be similarly overstated; thtrs, the
projections for 1984 to 1989 do not t-epresent a majot
break fiom the record shown in chart 5,19 Adjusted fot
While the total deficit declines r-elative to GNP in the
table, the str-ucturah deficit balloons up relative to GNP
until 1985, then r-emains quite high as real GNP ap-
proaches trend. These estimates show an unprece-
dented rise in the structural deficit and r’ecotd levels
persisting through the decade.
There are a number of reasons for viewing such
conclusions with extreme caution. First, estimates of
the structural deficit tend to be r-aised by the use of
trend GNP, since it is somewhat below the path of
high-employment GM’. The table also includes high-
employment measutes of the deficit for- 1980 to 1983,
for comparison putposes.5’ ‘the tr-end-hased estimates
of the str-uctural deficit in 1980—83 average about 1.3
percentage points higher than structural deficits that
“High-employment budget measures exist only through the third
quarter of 1 983, following themethods described bydeLeeuw and
others. Beginning in December 1983, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis switched to a new measure called a “cyclically adjusted”
budget. It is not comparable with the earlier series since the bench-
marklevel of GNP is an interpolation of“middle-expansion” phases
of the business cycle, at which points unemployment rates have
different structural/cyclical components. See deLeeuw and Hollo-
way (1 983). This measure alsois not comparable tothetrend-based
GNP measure analyzed by the Council of Economic Advisers
(1984) and used in table 1.
“The budget data in table I are for the unified budget, while the
high-employment measures are on an MAbasis, For a discussion
of the differences, see Pechman (1983), pp. 17—IS. The principal
difference is that the unified budget is measured on a cash basis,
when outlays or receipts are actually made, while the MA budget is
measured on an accrual basis; that is, receipts are measured by an
increase in tax liability, whether paid or not, and expenditures are
measured by purchases, whether cash outlays have been made or
not.
“Barro (1 984) arrives at the same conclusion. He develops a mode)
that explains deficits in terms of expected inflation rates, the busi-
ness cycle and temporary changes in government spending. His
estimates for the period since 1920 indicate that 1982—83 deficits
and projections for 1 984 are consistent with the previous structure
and do notindicate that therehas been a shift in fiscal policy toward
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this difference, the projected 1988—89 deficits are
slightly more than twice the standard deviation of the
high-employment deficit t-atio fron, 1955 to 1983, in-
stead of over three Limes as lar’ge.
Also, the deficits in table I ar-c curr-ent services esti-
mates. Currently proposed Administration policies
would reduce the structur-al deficit shown fur 1989 to
about 2.3 per-cent of actual or, roughly, trend CNP,
instead of the 3.8 per-cent shown in the table.’°
‘t’hitd, if actual economic conditions diffet from the
economic assumptions used for-the projections, future
deficits could be higher ot-lower than indicated. Some
analysts have been critical of adecline in interest rates
assumed in making the pr-ojection. If interest rates ar-e
higher than projected from 1984 to 1989, the actual and
structural deficits would be lar-ger.” Other-s have criti-
cized thepr-ojected I-ate ofeconomicgrowth as too low;
a higher- gr-owth rate would lowet the actual and pro-
jected deficit.’2
Economic assumptions are extremely impor-tant to
deficit projections. Carlson (1983) demonstr-ates, fot
example, that changes in assumptions about eco-
nomic conditions for- fiscal 1986, between projections
made in March 1981 and projections made in January
1983, accounted for most of a nearly tenfold rise in the
projected deficit from $21.0 billion to $203.1 billion.
Policy changes between the two projections ,educed
‘°The Administration proposals would do this by reducing a projected
23.0 percent share of outlays in GNP by 0.9 percentage points and
raising the 19.4 percent share of receipts by 0.4 percentage points,
reducing the projected actual deficit to 2.3 percent. The proposed
spending reductions include paring back 0.2 percentage points of
the rise in the share of national defense outlays. The rest of the
reduction is in net interest (0.2 percent), social security and Medic-
aid (0.1 percent) and other transfer payments and non-defense
expenditures,
“Thiscriticism is subject to a fundamental qualification, however. The
assumed lower interest rates from 1984 to 1989 are largely prem-
ised upon a decline in inflation. If recent or higher interest rates are
assumed because inflation is assumed to be the same or higher,
then the impact of the higher interest rates on the interest compo-
nent of outlays and the deficit would be more than offset by the
positive effect of inflation on receipts relative to expenditures.
“Foremost among the critics has been the Congressional Budget
Office (1984). Its principaldepartures from the assumptions used by
the Administration are that: interest rates decline much less for
1984—89 and real GNP growth is slower in 1986—89. As a result, the
deficit generally rises in the CBO projections, from $186 billion in
1984 to $248 billion in 1989.
The CBO does not discuss the structural deficit issue, Nonethe-
less, under its more pessimistic assumptions the deficit declines as
a share of GNP from 6.1 percent in 1983 to 5.2 percent in 1984, to
about 5 percent in 1985—87 and 104.8 percent and 4,6 percent in
1988 and 1989, respectively (p. 2). Moreover, its discussion of the
consequences of “large deficits” indicates that financing of such
deficits will take a substantially smaller share of gross and net
private domestic savings in 1984—85 than in 1983 (p. 19).
the projected deficit by about $39 billion, but down-
ward revisions in the projected levels ofpr-ices and real
GNP for’ 1986 raised it by $221 billion.
Even departures from near-term assumptions can
have relatively large effects on pr’ojected defi(~its~.For
example, at the end of July 1983, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget 119831 estimated that the unified
budget deficit fot- fiscal t983, which ended two months
later would show a deficit of $209.8 billion. Two
months later, the actual deficit ended up at $195.4
billion, primarily because outlays were about $13 bil-
lion lower than estimated two months eariier, when
most of the fiscal year had been comnpleted.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF
LARGE DEFICITS
Conventional economic theory suggests that rising
deficits may tend to raise prices, output and interest
rates, while depressing capital fot-mation. Obtaining
empirical support for all but the last of these hypoth-
eses has proved quite difficult, however.2t
In 1981, concern over rising deficits associated with
theEconomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 focused on the
anticipation that inct-easing deficits would over-heat
the economny and raise inflation, just as inflation mea-
sures began to plummet amid the economy entered the
worst recession since the 1930s.’4 Since then, in-
cr-eased attention has been focused on the effect of
deficits on interest nates anid capital formation dun-ing a
period in which, until t-ecently, interest n’ates were
declining and capital spending was unusually high
relative to GNP.’5 In part, finding evidence on the con-
sequences of deficit increases becomes difficult be-
“Carlson (1982) presents evidence supporting the view that deficits
crowd-out private sector capital formation.
‘4Hein (1981) explains the shortcomings of the hypothesized link
between deficits and inflation. Essentially, as he notes,the funda-
mental linkage in such a hypothesis is the extenttowhich deficits are
monetized; that is, the share of the deficit financed by the Federal
Reserve through money creation, primarily open market purchases
ofgovernment securities, There has been no such linkage since at
least 1974, Foracontrasting view, see Hamburgerand Zwick(1981,
1982). McMillin and Beard (1982) have pointed to some shortcom-
ings of the Hamburger-Zwick analysis.
“Curiously, analysesof proposals to deal with large future deficits by
raising taxes or cutting federal spending growth emphasize the
effects of such programs in avoiding rising interest rates that pur-
portedly could choke off the current expansion. Higher interest rates
resulting from future deficits, to the extent they would occur, are
already partof the existingstructure ofinterest rates. Such analyses
typically ignore conventional thinking, which emphasizes that such
fiscal programs directly retard spending and, hence, expansions,
despite any effect of lower interest rates, Kopcke (1983), forexam-
ple, has emphasized this point.
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cause of a failure to account for- the active/passive defi-
cit distinction. This problem is most apparent when
one looks at the investigation ofthe deficit-interest rate
link,
‘the actual patter-n of deficits and interest r-ates over’
the past four- years n-uns counter to the highen—delicit,
higher-interest rate hypothesis. Interest rates sky-
rocketed from ttl/1979 to 111/1981; long-term ‘treasury
security yields, forexample, rose fi-oni about 9 percent
to 14 percent. During the same period, the high-
employmnent deficit for the most recent four- quarter-s
fell from about $2 billion to $1 billion, and the actual
deficit rose from about $14 billion to $56 billion. Over
the next two years 1111/1981 to ltl/1983), long-term
Tn-easuny security yields fell fi-om 14 per’cent to 11.6
percent. Yet, in the latter- period, the actual deficit
ballooned up to $186 billion and the high-employment
deficit rose from near zero to about $57 billion.’”
A pt-incipal difficulty in intet-preting these move-
ments in interest rates and deficits is the failure to
account for theactive/passive deficit distinction, In the
past, deficits havebeen in hat-ge par-t passive, as chart S
indicates. Thus, it is not sur-prising that, during and
fbllowing periods of recession, deficits wen’e rising on-
“high,” and intenest tates wer-e falling or remained
“low,” The dominance of this negative cyclical rela-
tionship between passive deficits and interest nates
interferes substantially with empinical investigations of
the impact of deficits on inten-est rates. An example of
this confitsion is detailed in the insert on pages 16 and
17.
The second problem with testing the inten-est nate—
deficit hypothesis is that the U.S. economy has had
only limited peacetime experience with either lw-ge or
var-iable active deficits, n,easur-ed r’elative to CN P. As
char-t 5 indicates, deficits or’ sut-pluses i-ar-ely have cx-
ceeded 2 per-cent ofCNP on ahigh-emplo~menthasis,
Thus, should fiitur-e fedenal structural deficits he
lam-get’ than theywere in the ear-lien’ postwar exper-ience,
past empirical evidence would pn-o~ide little gu idanice
concerning the potential adverse effects on inflation
arid intet-est i-ate levels, Although past endence sug-
gests there are none, the economy has had no peace-
time experience with large, pen’sistemit stn-uctur-al defi—
“Another such striking parallel occurred in fiscal 1975 (measured
here as IV/1974 to 111/1975) when the deficit ballooned to $58.4
billion from $6.9 billion in fiscal 1974. This set a postwar record,
exceeding even the 1943 budgetdeficit of$54.9 billion, As a share
of GNP. the 3.8 percent 1975 deficitalso set a postwar record, not
exceeded until fiscal 1982. Nonetheless, 3-month Treasury bill rates
fell from about 9 percent in the fall of 1974 toabout 5.5 percent atthe
end of 1975, See Carlson (1976) and Lang (1977) for adiscussion of
this episode.
cits,as some analysts have suggested will occur from
1983 to 1989. Thus, the past ma\’ offer little r-elevant
evidence for assessing the futur’e efi’ects of deficits. Of
course, financial market participants have been
wan-ned of the potential magnitude of future deficits
and, to the extent such deficits could be expected to
r-aise inter-est m-ates, such effects alr’eady should have
been incorporated into the structun-e of tates. lnterest-
ingly enough, however, inter-est rates have gener-aliv
fallen since late 1981, even though it has been only
since thenthat the adverse deficitinfor-mation began to
he discerned and disseminated.
SUMMARY
In 1982—83, federal deficits surged to triple-digit
levels. Moreover’, administration and CR0 pr’ojections
indicate they will r-emain so, at least tht-ough 1989.
These deficits have arisen fr-oni the unsatisfactory cy-
clical perfor-mance ofthe U.S. economy. Typically, fed-
er-al expenditures an-c naised when utiemplovment is
highet- and tax receipts are lower-. Recessions in 1980
and 1981—82 have left the unemplovmnent n-ate at un-
usually high levels since 1980-Suggestions that either a
rise in defense spending or cuts in tax rates have
played major rolesin the creation ofrecent deficits are
niisleading.
Pmojections tend to show deficits declining as a sha,e
of CNP, but structural deficit projections show a
worsening trend in 1984.—85 and little impn-ovenient in
1986—89, Should the cun-n-ent cyclical deficit he trans-
fot-med into a stn-uctural deficit, it is not clear- what
consequences such a development would have.‘I’liere
is little evidence suppon’ting theadverse consequences
ofa sharp increase in the structural deficit. ‘The lack of
such evidence, however-, may at-ise fr-onn the fact that
the United States has had no expen’ience with ‘‘lar-ge’’
peacetime stnuctural deficits.
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